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a b s t r a c t 
In much of the research with respect to the use of credit ratings, the notion of rating 
shopping features prominently. One form of rating shopping predicts that investors price 
the risk that arises when securities have fewer than three ratings. Inconsistent with what 
rating shopping would predict, our study shows that for the largest European structured ﬁ- 
nance market, the triple A sector of the senior European residential mortgage-backed mar- 
ket prior to 2007, investors demanded a premium for more ratings. Moreover, we ﬁnd 
that certain characteristics unique to structured ﬁnance securities that investors perceive 
as complex, determine whether issuers opt for a higher number of triple A ratings. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
The U.S. subprime mortgage crisis that began in 2007 called for a closer examination of the use of credit ratings assigned
to structured products. In much of the ensuing literature, rating shopping is prominently featured. The common view of the
rating shopping hypothesis is that issuers only select those credit rating agencies (CRAs) that are willing to provide the
highest rating, thus deliberately reducing the number of ratings obtained (see Bolton et al. (2012), Farhi et al. (2013), Griﬃn
et al. (2013) , and Fabozzi and Vink (2015) ). In this line of analysis, it is expected that a security’s funding cost would increase
because investors price the risk that issuers “shopped for the best rating” when tranches have fewer than three ratings of
the major CRAs, Moody’s, Fitch and S&P ( He et al. (2012) ). 
So far, no empirical work has examined whether higher funding costs are expected for securities that do not carry three
ratings in the European triple A senior sector of the structured ﬁnance market. Such research is needed because follow-
ing the events of 20 07–20 08, the European Union (EU) policymakers adopted regulations requiring all structured ﬁnance
securities to have at least two ratings 1 . In Europe, the triple A sector of the senior residential mortgage-backed securities∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: frank.fabozzi@edhec.edu (F.J. Fabozzi), mike.nawas@bishopsﬁeldcapital.com (M.E. Nawas), d.vink@nyenrode.nl (D. Vink). 
1 Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating 
agencies (CRA III). 
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Table 1 
Summary of variable statistics (421 observations). 
Number of Ratings N Percent 
1 40 9 .5 
2 213 50 .6 
3 168 39 .9 
Total 421 100 .0 
Tranches with Dual Ratings N Percent 
Moody’s and S&P 79 37 .1 
Moody’s and Fitch 99 47 .5 
S&P and Fitch 35 16 .4 
Total 213 100 .0 
Type of triple A tranche N Percent 
Senior Tranche 167 39 .7 
Super-Senior Tranche 87 20 .6 
Senior-Subordinated Tranche 167 39 .7 
Total 421 100 .0 
Mean Std 
Spread at Issue 20.777 10 .901 
Log of Tranche Par Value 8.544 0 .529 
Subordination Level 0.222 0 .267 
Weighted Average Life 4.537 2 .059 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (RMBS) is the mainstay of the structured ﬁnance market 2 . In our paper, we test whether prior to the 2007 crisis the inverse
relationship between the number of ratings and funding cost predicted by the rating shopping hypothesis was empirically
valid for this market. Our results show that the predicted relationship by this hypothesis is not supported. We suggest an
explanation for this ﬁnding. 
2. Data 
We collected the entire set of triple A rated Euro-denominated senior RMBS between 1999 and 2006 as reported in
Structured Finance International (SFI). We focus on triple A tranches as this represents by far the largest part of the RMBS
market and because in this market the lower rated tranches typically only exist by virtue of the need to provide credit
support to a related triple A rated senior tranche. The 2007 cut-off was intentional for two reasons. First, regulatory bodies
speciﬁcally targeted structured ﬁnance securities with the requirement to have more than one credit rating with reference
to their role in the 2007 crisis, so the relevant dataset has to be up to 2007. Second, since the crisis, the number of new
structured ﬁnance securities sold to investors has dropped dramatically, resulting in too few observations for empirical
analysis. 
We consider only ﬂoating-rate tranches benchmarked off the European interbank offered rate (EURIBOR) and issued at
par. Provided the tranche is issued at par, the quoted margin or spread over the EURIBOR represents the tranche’s relevant
incremental funding cost at issuance. The reason this spread measure is used rather than secondary market spreads is that
the latter vary throughout a tranche’s life, being impacted by not only the rating but the collateral’s performance (defaults
and recoveries). This problem does not exist when using new issuance spreads. 
We consider tranches assigned the highest rating, triple A, by at least one of the three major CRAs. Each RMBS is placed
into one of three mutually exclusive groups: One Rater (40/9.5%), Two Raters (213/50.6%), or Three Raters (168/39.9%). 
Our ﬁnal sample includes 421 tranches, representing 79% of the entire set of Euro-denominated triple A rated senior
RMBS issued in the period 1999 to 2006, with a total par value of €221.15 billion (84% of total par value). Table 1 provides
summary statistics for our sample. 
We consider two structural features unique to RMBS that introduce a certain degree of complexity to the security: credit
enhancement via subordination, and slicing a senior triple A rated security into a “super-senior” and “senior-subordinated”
triple A security. We will explain both below. 
The most commonly applied structured ﬁnance technique to obtain a triple A rating is by applying subordination to
enhance the creditworthiness of the structure’s most senior tranche. The more one increases the relative amount of subor-
dinated capital supporting a senior tranche, the more that senior tranche is protected from investment losses and is able to
receive a triple A rating. 
Although all the tranches in our study are senior tranches, there are three types of senior tranches receiving triple A
ratings. The ﬁrst is what we refer to as a “standard” senior tranche. The second is a structure which has two different senior2 Quoting the European Securitisation Forum’s Quarterly Data Report Summer 2007: “RMBS continued to be the leading issuance sector with €159.6 
billion and 56.9 percent of overall volume of total securitised volume through the second quarter” ( ESF (2007) , page 2). 
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Table 2 
Regressions of triple A RMBS spread to number of ratings (421observations). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
One Rater – – -3.21 ∗∗∗ -2 .99 ∗∗
– – ( −2.71) (−2 .63) 
Two Raters 3.21 ∗∗∗ 2.99 ∗∗∗ – –
(2.71) (2.63) – –
Three Raters 5.25 ∗∗∗ 5.28 ∗∗∗ 2.04 ∗∗∗ 2 .2 ∗∗∗
(4.29) (4.39) (2.81) (3 .30) 
Log of Tranche Par Value −4.51 ∗∗∗ −4.57 ∗∗∗ -4.52 ∗∗∗ −4 .57 ∗∗∗
( −3.15) ( −4.21) ( −3.14) (−4 .21) 
Subordination Level −12.06 ∗∗∗ −13.94 ∗∗∗ −12.06 ∗∗∗ −13 .94 ∗∗∗
( −4.21) ( −5.66) ( −4.22) (−5 .67) 
Weighted Average Life 0.33 0.09 0.33 0 .09 
(0.73) (0.33) (0.73) (0 .32) 
Super-Senior Tranche −0.34 −0.68 −0.34 −0 .69 
( −0.27) ( −0.53) ( −0.27) (−0 .54) 
Senior-Subordinated Tranche 1.39 0.76 1.39 0 .76 
(1.62) (1.02) (1.62) (1 .03) 
Issuer Fixed Effects no yes no yes 
Time Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R 2 0.62 0.67 0.62 0 .67 
F -test 18.69 18.17 18.70 18 .17 
Joint Wald test “Three Raters”
and “Two Raters” (t-statistics) 
(2.81) (3.30) – –
Joint Wald test “Three Raters”
and “One Rater” (t-statistics) 
– – (5.02) (5 .19) 
Notes: Dependent variable is a tranche’s issuance spread. The coeﬃcient and White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted t -statistic are shown in brackets. In regressions (1) and (2) the 
omitted class is One Rater; Two Raters is the omitted class in regressions (3) and (4). 
Dashes denote not included in the analysis; 
∗∗ denote parameter estimates for which zero falls outside the 95% posterior conﬁdence 
intervals. 
∗∗∗ denote parameter estimates for which zero falls outside the 99% posterior conﬁdence 
intervals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 tranches, with one senior tranche, called the “super-senior tranche”, having priority over the other senior tranche, called the
“senior-subordinated tranche.” Consequently, there are three types of senior tranches: standard (167/39.7%), super-senior
(87/20.6%), and senior-subordinated (167/39.7%). 
3. Does the market price in rating shopping? 
Table 2 shows the empirical results for several regressions where the dependent variable is the issuance spread. We have
controlled for credit quality differences because we only include senior tranches rated triple A. We used a heteroskedasticity-
consistent variance-covariance matrix as suggested by White (1980) . To deal with potential error-dependence, we follow
Petersen (2009) by including time ﬁxed effects and accounting for issuer ﬁxed effects: we cluster for all tranches issued
by the same deal. We control for deal characteristics, such as expected weighted-average life and size (log of tranche par
value), to obtain robust cross-sectional results. 
From regression (1) in Table 2 we see that the coeﬃcients of two and three raters (one rater being the omitted class)
are positive and highly signiﬁcant. For example, we observe a spread increase of about ﬁve basis points (4.29 t -statistic) for
three ratings compared to one rating. The results are robust when controlling for issuer ﬁxed effects (see regression (2)).
The Wald test in regressions (1) to (2) indicates that the difference in coeﬃcients between three raters and two raters is
always positive and highly signiﬁcant. In regressions (3) and (4) we observe that, on average, tranches with three triple A
ratings have a signiﬁcantly higher issuance spread than tranches with two triple A ratings (the omitted class). For exam-
ple, in regression (4), where we control for issuer ﬁxed effects, we observe an issuance spread increase of more than two
basis points (3.30 t -statistic) for three compared to two ratings. The Wald test in regressions (3) and (4) indicates that the
difference in coeﬃcients between three raters and one rater is always positive and highly signiﬁcant. 
In sum, triple A tranches by two or three CRAs had, on average, a higher issuance spread than tranches with only one
triple A rating, and tranches with three triple A ratings had on average a higher issuance spread than tranches with two
triple A ratings. These empirical results lead us to conclude that, all other factors in the model held constant, investors
demanded a premium for more credit ratings in the triple A senior sector of the European RMBS market. Please cite this article as: F.J. Fabozzi et al., Exploring rating shopping for european triple a senior structured ﬁnance 
securities, Finance Research Letters (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2016.08.013 
4 F.J. Fabozzi et al. / Finance Research Letters 0 0 0 (2016) 1–5 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: FRL [m3Gsc; September 28, 2016;13:16 ] 
Table 3 
Logistic regressions for having multiple triple A credit ratings for RMBS tranches (421 observations). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of Tranche Par Value 0.24 – – – – 0.93 ∗∗∗
(1.48) – – – – (3.70) 
Subordination level – 1.40 ∗∗∗ – – – 3.22 ∗∗∗
– (3.47) – – – (3.49) 
Weighted Average Life – – −0.20 ∗∗∗ – – −0.11 
– – ( −4.21) – – ( −1.59) 
Super-Senior Tranche – – – 0.44 – −1.05 ∗∗
– – – (1.64) – ( −2.19) 
Senior-Subordinated Tranche – – – 1.22 ∗∗∗ – 1.40 ∗∗∗
– – – (4.92) – (5.03) 
R-squared 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.17 
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of credit ratings for each tranche and is a categorical 
variable that is ordered. This test shows how independent factors relate to tranches that report 
higher or lower number of credit ratings. The number of CRAs takes the value of 1 if the tranche is 
rated by one CRA, a value of 2 if the tranche is rated by two CRAs, and a value of 3 if the tranche is 
rated by three CRAs. Year dummies are included in the model but are not reported. Dashes denote 
that the variable was not included in the analysis. Log-odds (logit) regression with Huber-White 
adjusted z-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
∗∗ denote parameter estimates for which zero falls outside the 95% posterior conﬁdence intervals. 
∗∗∗ denote parameter estimates for which zero falls outside the 99% posterior conﬁdence intervals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4. Why do issuers select multiple triple A ratings? 
Our results suggest that in the European senior RMBS market, issuers reporting more than one triple A rating realize
higher funding costs. Why would issuers select multiple triple A ratings when it is costly to do so? What we would expect
is that issuers, in this particular market, do so because they need to obtain more than one rating for tranches that investors
consider to be more complex compared to more straightforward tranches. In order to test this, we use an ordered logit test
to investigate what impact two commonly applied features unique to the structured ﬁnance market have on the issuer’s
decision to obtain multiple ratings: subordination levels and the inclusion of a super-senior tranche and senior-subordinated
tranche. 
To minimize a transaction’s total funding cost, RMBS issuers typically strive to minimize the level of subordination to
the level that only just satisﬁes the level required by a CRA to allow the senior tranche to be rated triple A. So if a senior
tranche is supported by a relatively high level of subordination, investors will assume that this was unavoidable to the issuer
and they will wish to understand the reasons for that. More scrutiny is required, beyond credit risk (as the tranches are all
triple A, which controls for credit risk), and hence the investment decision has become more complex. We would expect
that in such situations the issuer will seek to obtain more than one credit rating. The implication is that in our analysis we
consider the subordination level as a factor that is driving the choice about the number of ratings. 
Similarly, the existence of two triple A tranches in one transaction, i.e. a super-senior and a senior-subordinated tranche,
may be another indicator of capital structure complexity compared to transactions where there is only one, standard, se-
nior tranche. The senior-subordinated tranches may merit deeper investor scrutiny and as a result need more ratings (even
though they are all rated triple A), as these tranches are clearly engineered for reasons beyond achieving a triple A rating. 
Table 3 shows that the highlighted characteristics have a very signiﬁcant impact on multiple ratings. In columns (2) and
(6) we see a highly signiﬁcant positive log odds-ratio for subordination levels. This means that, all other factors in the model
held constant, tranches with higher subordination levels are more likely to have three triple A ratings versus two and one.
Columns (4) and (6) show similar results for senior-subordinated tranches with reported log-odds above zero. If we look
at column (6), the odds of senior-subordinated tranches having three credit ratings, versus two and one, are 4.06 greater,
given the other factors held constant 3 . One possible explanation for these ﬁndings is that in the triple A rated senior sector
of the RMBS market, issuers obtain more than one rating for tranches with complex features, and less than three ratings for
securities with more straightforward features. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate rating shopping in the pre-2007 European RMBS triple A rated senior market in terms of
funding costs. We ﬁnd that more ratings will lead to additional higher funding costs, a ﬁnding inconsistent with rating shop-
ping. There is a possible explanation. Our results suggest that issuers obtain the number of ratings based on the tranche’s
complexity. Even though the credit risk may be assumed to be the same (all are triple A), more complex tranches require
more ratings than more straightforward tranches. It is reasonable to expect that investors use the number of credit ratings3 In order to calculate the odds ratio, one calculates the exponential of the log-odds ratio. This gives e 1.40 =4.06. 
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 in their risk assessment, providing an additional signal for the tranche’s complexity and related risk. As a result, multiple
triple A ratings would be associated with higher additional funding costs. 
Our results have an important implication for EU regulatory reform. The EU refers to RMBS as “complex” securities.
However, triple A RMBS tranches can vary in complexity. Policymakers should be cognizant of the risk that a requirement
of a minimum of two ratings for all structured ﬁnance securities could not be meaningful for senior tranches (without
complex features) while it increases the cost to issuers who could otherwise have chosen only one CRA to rate a tranche.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the European Union’s regulations governing the minimum number of credit ratings on complex
senior securities should be reconsidered until there is a better understanding of the signal provided by multiple ratings.
Hence, further research with respect to the use of credit ratings in the structured ﬁnance market is needed, to enable
policy-makers, in the EU and elsewhere, to develop regulations that address investor concerns regarding the complexity of
securities. 
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